The goal of this paper is twofold: first, we give overview of the results of one part of the Fuzzy Natural Logic -the formal theory of intermediate quantifiers and syllogisms based on them. We present 105 valid basic syllogisms and show that for the proof of validity of all of them, we need to prove validity of only few of them so that validity of the other ones immediately follows. In the second part of the paper, we focused on conditions under which non-trivial intermediate syllogisms are valid. The latter are syllogisms which contain two or even three general intermediate quantifiers (not equal to any of ∀ or ∃).
introduction
Fuzzy natural logic (FNL) is a formal mathematical theory that consists of three theories: (1) a formal theory of evaluative linguistic expressions explained in detail in [13] , (2) a formal theory of fuzzy IF-THEN rules and approximate reasoning presented in [12, 15] , and (3) a formal theory of intermediate and generalized fuzzy quantifiers presented in [3, 14, 7, 9] . The intermediate quantifiers are linguistic expressions, such as most, many, almost all, a few, a large part of, etc. FNL is developed using formal tools of the fuzzy type theory (FTT) that was in detail elaborated in [11] . Its formal language is extended lambda calculus. The main goal of this paper is to summarize results on syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers. These syllogisms generalize classical Aristotle ones (cf. [21] ) in the sense that they contain intermediate quantifiers and, therefore, we will call them intermediate syllogisms.
Our theory is based on formalization of the results of Thomson, who introduced in [22] the intermediate quantifiers "Few", "Many" and "Most" and their syllogisms. His approach was later elaborated and extended by adding new intermediate quantifiers by P. L. Peterson in [20] . Altogether, they prove Validity of 105 intermediate syllogisms using Venn's diagrams. In [14] , Novák introduced a formal theory of intermediate quantifiers using the fuzzy type theory (a higher-order fuzzy logic). Other mathematical models of some of these quantifiers were suggested by several authors, for example Hájek, Pereira and other ones ( [4, 17, 18] ). In the view of the classical theory of generalized quantifiers, our quantifiers are of type ⟨1, 1⟩ (cf. [6, 19, 23] ) which are isomorphism-invariant (cf. [5, 3] ), have extension property and are conservative. The basic idea consists in the assumption that intermediate quantifiers are just classical quantifiers ∀ or ∃ but the universe of quantification is modified. This is achieved using the theory of evaluative linguistic expressions (see [13] ) developed as a special theory of higher-order fuzzy logic. In [7] , we proved that withing our formal theory, all of 105 intermediate syllogisms of Peterson are valid. In [9] , we generalized this approach and we showed that validity of syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers follows from validity of only few syllogisms taken as basic. It is highly important to note that we are able to prove the results on a syntactical level. Hence, by completeness of the fuzzy type theory, the syllogisms are valid in all models. We showed that most of the syllogisms are simply valid in all models. There are, syllogisms, however, which can be valid in special models and invalid in other ones. This concerns especially nontrivial intermediate syllogisms, i.e., such in whose premises and, possibly also in conclusion general (I.e., none of them is classical ∀ or ∃.) intermediate quantifiers occur. Besides the overview of the known results, we also present new results concerning non-trivial syllogisms of Figure IV .
Preliminaries and notation
Because of limited space, we will give only few hints of our formalism. The interested reader is referred to the cited papers. The formal theory of intermediate quantifiers is developed within special higher order fuzzy logic -the fuzzy type theory, which was introduced in [11] . The algebra of truth values is assumed to be a linearly ordered MV-algebra extended by the delta operation whose canonical example is the standard Łukasiewicz MV ∆ -algebra
(see [2, 16] 
, ≡ (fuzzy equality/equivalence), ∆ ∆ ∆ (delta connective; This is interpreted by ∆ where ∆(1) = 1 and ∆(a) = 0 for all a < 1.) The theory of intermediate quantifiers (denoted by T IQ and introduced in [14] ) is an extension of a special formal theory T Ev of Ł-FTT, which is a theory of the meaning of evaluative linguistic expressions (see [13] ). Recall that these are expressions of natural language such as small, medium, big, very short, more or less deep, roughly strong, etc. All the details, justification of the formal theory T Ev including its special axioms and motivation can be found in [13] . The language J Ev of T Ev has the following special symbols:
(i) The standard constants ⊤, ⊥ (truth and falsity), also a constant † ∈ Form o , which represents a middle truth value (in the standard Łukasiewicz MV ∆ -algebra, it is interpreted by 0.5).
(ii) A special constant ∼ ∈ Form (oo)o for an additional fuzzy equality on the set of truth values L.
(iii) Three special formulas LH, MH, RH ∈ Form oo (they represent left, right and middle horizon, respectively).
(iv) A special constantν ν ν ∈ Form oo for the standard hedge and further special constants Ex, Si, Ve, ML, Ro, QR, VR for specific hedges ("extremely, significantly, very, more or less, roughly, quite roughly, very roughly", respectively).
(v) Special constants a ν ν ν , b ν ν ν , c ν ν ν associated with each hedge ν ν ν ∈ {Ex, Si, Ve, ML, Ro, QR, VR}. The following is provable:
Intensions of simple evaluative expressions are defined by following formulas:
Then, e.g. Bi Ve is intension of the linguistic expression "very big", etc.
The following special formulas play a role in our theory below:
(general truth value)
Thus, in any model M and any formula A o of type truth value, 
We say that the formula µ ∈ Form (o(oα))(oα) represents a generalized measure on fuzzy sets in the universe of type α ∈ Types if it has the following properties:
We must also introduce a special predicate M o(oα) to characterize measurable fuzzy sets (the details are here omitted). 
By a simple computation we can show that
and µ be a formula representing a measure. Then the following holds true:
A syllogism is a special kind of a logical argument in which the conclusion is inferred from two premises: the major premise (first) and minor premise (second). The syllogisms will be written as triples of formulas ⟨P 1 , P 2 ,C⟩ of type truth value. The intermediate syllogism is obtained from any traditional syllogism (valid or not) when replacing one or more of its formulas by formulas containing intermediate quantifiers.
holds true.
Formalization of intermediate quantifiers and syllogisms
Intermediate quantifiers form a special class of fuzzy generalized ones. We develop their theory within a special formal theory T IQ [S] of Ł-FTT where S is a set of distinguished types (This must be considered to avoid possible difficulties with interpretation of the formula µ representing measure. The set S is supposed not to include too complex types α that would correspond to sets of very large, possibly non-measurable cardinalities). It is obtained as a certain extension of the theory of evaluative linguistic expressions T Ev . A detailed structure of the theory of T IQ [S] and precise definitions can be found in [7, 8, 14] . 
To explain the meaning of this definition, note the following scheme:
size of z is evaluated by Ev (3.9)
By putting of the specific evaluative linguistic expression we obtain the definition of the concrete intermediate quantifier. By Ex Bi we mean that the fuzzy set z is "extremely big" w.r.t. B, the formula Bi Ve denotes the fact that the fuzzy set z is "very big" w.r.t. B and, finally, by ¬ ¬ ¬(Smν ν ν) we understand that z is "not small" w.r.t. B.
Definition 3.2. The following special intermediate quantifiers can be introduced:
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The following theorem demonstrates that an important role in our theory is played by monotonicity. 
Classification of intermediate syllogisms
The syllogistic reasoning was founded by Aristotle and his school (cf. [21] 
Valid intermediate syllogisms
In [9] , we generalized all the above mentioned syllogisms and demonstrated that in each figure, there is one basic syllogism the validity of which implies the validity of several other ones. The figures below summarize examples of strongly-valid syllogisms in T IQ . It is highly important to note that we are able to prove the results on a syntactical level, thus the Ł-FTT completeness implies the validity of the results in every model. The basic syllogisms are marked by a circle. A dashed circle marks a syllogism which neither implies any other syllogism nor it is implied by any other one. We introduce only a few strongly valid syllogisms. A full list of all the 105 generalized syllogisms can be found in [7] . The syllogisms are denoted by triples of bold letters assigned to each intermediate quantifier introduced in Definition 3.2. The first two letters are premises, the third one is conclusion.
Figure-I
We start with a typical example of a valid syllogism.
ATT-I
P 1 : All women are well dressed. Analogously we can prove validity of the negative syllogisms of Figure- I.
Figure-II Theorem 3.3 ([7]). Let EAE, EPB, ETD, EFV, EKG, EIO be strongly-valid syllogisms of Figure-II in T IQ . Then the following syllogisms are valid in T IQ :
Example:
No lazy people pass exam P 2 Most students pass exam C Some students are not lazy people
Figure-III A very interesting group of non-trivial intermediate syllogisms, which generalize the corresponding ones presented in Peterson's book are presented below. Their non-triviality consists in the use of two non-classical intermediate quantifiers and thus, their validity is by no means obvious. To prove their validity, we must strengthen our assumptions.

Definition 3.3. Let B ∈ Form oα . By T [B] we denote a theory being extension of T IQ such that
• T [B] ⊢ (∃x α )∆ ∆ ∆Bx .
We begin with presentation of positive syllogisms of Figure-III. Recall that, by dotted line we marked a subgroup of non-trivial valid syllogisms which follow from the basic ones laying inside (marked by circles).
Theorem 3.4 ([7]). (a) Validity of syllogisms PKI-III, TFI-III, FTI-III, KPI-III in T [B] implies validity of all the syllogisms denoted by the dotted line. (b) Validity of syllogisms AII-III, IAI-III in T IQ implies validity of the other syllogisms.
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Analogously we can analyze the strongly valid syllogisms of Figure- IV (see [9] ). 
Syllogism KKI-III
Then there is a non-trivial model M |= T in which the syllogisms KKI-III is not true.
Axiom (3.11) describes the situation that the fuzzy sets z and z ′ , that are considered inside the both intermediate quantifiers in the both premises, are rather small (but not too much which is guaranteed by ϒ) and their Łukasiewicz intersection is empty.
Non-trivial syllogisms of Figure-I More complicated is the syllogism of Figure-I, which was first considered by Zadeh in [24](Zadeh calls it Multiplicative Chaining Syllogism and interchanged the premises). Example of such syllogism is as follows: P 1 : Most heavy cars (B) are expensive (Y). P 2 : Most American cars (X) are heavy (B). C: Most 2 American cars (X) are expensive (Y). (3.12)
According to Zadeh, the expression Most 2 should be read as "at least Most 2 ". Because Zadeh's approach is characterized by the interpretation of fuzzy quantifiers as fuzzy numbers then the quantifier of the conclusion is calculate by using the Quantifier Extension Principle (see [24] 
) The figure below demonstrates a situation in which the syllogism is invalid:
This means that the syllogism, in general, cannot be valid. However, we can specify special condition, under which the syllogism can be true. For example, if we add the assumption B ⊆ X (see [24] ) and assume that B is big enough to take it as "most of X", then the syllogism becomes true -see the following figure:
Let us replace "Most 2 " in the syllogism (3.12) by "Some":
Most heavy cars (B) are expensive (Y). P 2 : Most American cars (X) are heavy (B). C: Some American cars (X) are expensive (Y).
(3.13)
Recall that validity of the positive and also negative generalized syllogisms with one intermediate quantifier in the minor premise and with particular conclusion was syntactically proved in [7] (see the list of syllogisms in Section 3).
Theorem 3.8 ([10]). Let X,Y, B ∈ Form oα be formulas of a theory T being an extension of the theory T IQ so that the following is provable:
(3.14)
Then there is a non-trivial model of M |= T in which the syllogism (3.13) is true.
Formula (3.14) says that there exists a fuzzy set z ⊆ B, which is "very big"(In the sense of the measure µ) w.r.t. B, and x ⊆ X which is "very big" w.r.t. z. This guarantees that the intersection of the both fuzzy sets X and Y is non-empty and thus the syllogism (3.13) is strongly valid in the theory T .
We may also ask whether the discussed syllogism can be true with the following non-particular conclusion: We can see that syllogisms (3.16 ) is similar to syllogisms of Figure-I 
Then there is a non-trivial model of M |= T in which syllogism (3.16 ) is valid.
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Proof. We will consider a model M |= T with a finite set of elements M ε in which the premises are true as well and show that the conclusion is true as well. For simplicity, we will take
Major premise: "Most B are X".
Let us assume that
This means that we must find a subset Let us suppose that
Then we have to find a fuzzy set M (z oα ) = B ′ ⊂ ∼ M α such that B ′ ⊆ B and the following holds true: We can see that validity of this syllogism is established on the assumption that the fuzzy set Z is a "very big" in the fuzzy set Y and also the fuzzy set X is a "very big" in the fuzzy set Z. Let us remark that under special conditions, it is possible to strengthen (3.16) even to syllogism with non-particular conclusion, as in the following example: This will be the topic of a subsequent paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we gave an overview of results concerning one of the formal theories of fuzzy natural logic, namely intermediate quantifiers and their syllogisms. We summarized all of the 105 valid intermediate syllogisms and demonstrated that the validity of them can be proved by proving the validity of only a few syllogisms taken as basic, while the validity of the others ones follows from the former. Because our results are proved on a syntactical level, validity of all the proved syllogisms holds in every model by completeness of the fuzzy type theory. We also focused on a special subclass of non-trivial syllogisms. We showed that these syllogisms are not valid in general but can be valid under special conditions. We studied the syllogism KKI-III and analyzed it in a finite model. We showed that there is a model in which this syllogism is valid and on the other hand there exists a model in which the corresponding syllogism is invalid. We also mentioned special non-trivial intermediate syllogisms studied under the name Multiplicative Chaining Syllogisms introduced by Zadeh in [24] . Finally, we showed conditions under which a special non-trivial syllogism of Figure IV can also be valid.
